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Abstract—This paper introduces a new concept called
controllable ring signature which is ring signature with
additional properties as follow. (1) Anonymous identifica-
tion: by an anonymous identification protocol, the real
signer can anonymously prove his authorship of the ring
signature to the verifier. And this proof is non-transferable.
(2) Linkable signature: the real signer can generate an
anonymous signature such that every one can verify whether
both this anonymous signature and the ring signature are
generated by the same anonymous signer. (3) Convertibility:
the real signer can convert a ring signature into an ordinary
signature by revealing the secret information about the ring
signature. These additional properties can fully ensure the
interests of the real signer. Especially, compared with a
standard ring signature, a controllable ring signature is
more suitable for the classic application of leaking secrets.
We construct a controllable ring signature scheme which is
provably secure according to the formal definition. As an
application, we design a E-prosecution scheme based on this
controllable ring signature scheme and show its security.
Index Terms—Certificateless cryptography; certificateless
threshold decryption; provable security; random oracle
model; bilinear pairing
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of ring signatures was introduced by
Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in [2]. It enables any individ-
ual to spontaneously conscript arbitrarily n − 1 entities
and generate a publicly verifiable 1-out-of-n signature
on behalf of the whole group (called a ring), yet the
actual signer remains anonymous. Many extensions of a
standard ring signature, such as linkable ring signature
[3], convertible ring signature [4], separable ring signa-
ture [5], [6], threshold ring signature [7], ID-based ring
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signature [8], proxy ring signature [9], ring authenticated
encryption [10], conditionally anonymous ringsignature
[11] have been proposed in the literature. Ring signature
and its variants have been used in many applications
such as leaking secrets [2], designated verifier signature
[2], anonymous identification/authentication for ad hoc
groups [7], e-voting [3], e-cash, attestation in [12], bidder-
anonymous english auction [13] and so on.
For the motivation of our new concept, we revisit the
classic application of ring signatures in leaking secrets.
Suppose that Bob (also known as “Deep Throat”) is a
member of the cabinet of Lower Kryptonia, and that
Bob wishes to leak a juicy fact to a journalist about the
escapades of the Prime Minister, in such a way that Bob
remains anonymous, yet such that the journalist is con-
vinced that the leak was indeed from a cabinet member.
At a glance, it seems that a standard ring signature can
help Bob to perfectly complete this task: he signs the
message using a ring signature scheme on behalf of the
whole cabinet. However, the following cases will show
that a standard ring signature is not enough for leaking
secrets in the real world.
(1) Suppose that another cabinet member Charlie is a
good friend of the Prime Minister. To help the Prime
Minister, Charlie generates a ring signature on an
announcement. It states that he is the leaker and the
previous published story about the Prime Minister
is not true but a political joke. Of course, Bob’s
ring signature and Charlie’s ring signature use the
same “ring” – the whole cabinet. Now, how can
Bob prevent this impersonation?
(2) Suppose that the journalist is very interested in these
leaked secrets and wants to communicate with the
real signer in order to discuss more details. So the
journalist publishes his telephone number and wants
the real signerto contact him through an anonymous
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phone call. How can Bob convince the journalist
that the anonymous call is from the real signer
through a untransferable proof?
(3) Suppose that Bob needs to publish further proofs for
the escapades of the Prime Minister. How can Bob
make people believe that both the previous secrets
and these further proofs are leaked by the same
anonymous cabinet member?
(4) After the disgraced Prime Minister is disposed, Bob
maybe wants to remove the anonymity of the ring
signature. In other words, how can Bob convert the
ring signature into a standard digital signature?
Roughly speaking, (2) motivate the topic of secure anony-
mous identification; (3) can be captured by the notion of
the linkability of anonymous signatures; (4) can be for-
malized as the notion of convertibility of a ring signature.
A. Related Work
Some extensions of a standard ring signature can only
partially solve the above mentioned problems. In fact, the
above problems were not so comprehensively pointed out
in existing literature. Now we briefly review these related
work.
Linkable ring signatures proposed in [3] have some
limitations for leaking secrets. First, the schemes in [3]
are not unconditionally but computationally anonymous.
Secondly, every one can deny a ring signature if he is
not the real signer. Thirdly, the real signer can’t deny the
ring signature generated by himself. In fact, in [3], the
linkability of a ring signature was proposed mainly for
restricting the real signer. For example, a linkable ring
signature can prevent a ring member from generating two
ring signatures on the message in the applications such as
E-cash and E-voting. On the contrary, in the application
of leaking secrets, the attention should be focused on how
to fully ensure the interests of the real signer.
The convertible ring signature scheme proposed in [4]
is the extension of a ring signature scheme proposed
in [2]. It deals with only the convertibility of the ring
signature scheme. And their construction cannot be triv-
ially extended to deal with the linkability and anonymous
identification. Additionally, the authors did not formalize
the security model for the convertibility of ring signatures
and their analysis is too simple.
The modified ring signature in [2] can guarantee only
the computational anonymity. The proposed way can be
used to show that a non-signer is not the real signer. A
similar way can be used to show who is the real signer.
In fact, they proposed a way to convert a ring signature
to an ordinary signature. However, it seems difficult to
extend their way to deal with the properties of linkability
and anonymous authorship of a ring signature.
B. Contributions
Our contributions are twofold, as listed below. On the
one hand, we revisit the classic application of ring sig-
natures in leaking secrets and point out a list of practical
problems unsolved by a standard ring signature. Motivat-
ed by these problems, we formalize the new notion of
controllable ring signature. It is a useful cryptographic
primitive which can fully ensure the interests of the real
signer and rightly restrict him as follows.
(1) The real signer remains unconditionally anonymous
unless he himself exposes his identity.
(2) Despite the unconditional anonymity, the real signer
has enough power to control his signature in the sense
that he can anonymously prove his authorship, generate
a linkable signature, and convert the controllable ring
signature.
(3) Despite the full power to control his signature, the
real signer is rightly restricted since he is not able to
generate a controllable ring signature and then convince
a third party that it is generated by others.
(4) Despite the unconditional anonymity, any other par-
ty (non-signer) cannot abuse the anonymity. For example,
there is no way for him to present the proof that the ring
signature is (or not) due to him.
On the other hand, we propose an efficient construc-
tion of a controllable ring signature, which is based on
the standard ring signature of Abe et al. [6]. And the
underlying paradigm may also be used to transform other
standard ring signatures to controllable ones.
At last, as an application, we design an E-Prosection
scheme and analyze its security.
II. FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. Syntax of Controllable Ring Signature
Definition 1 (Syntax of CRS): A controllable ring
signature scheme contains eight algorithms (or protocols):
GenKey, RSign/RVerify, AIdentify, SSign/SVerify,
Convert/CVerify as follows:
- GenKey: On input a security parameter 1κ, it
outputs a private key sk and a public key pk.
- Rsign: It takes a message m, the list, say L, of pub-
lic keys {pki}i=n−1i=0 of ring members {Ai}
i=n−1
i=0
and the real signer Ak’s secret key skk, and outputs
a controllable ring signature σ and a secret informa-
tion π. σ is public and π is secretly stored by Ak.
We will call {pki}i=n−1i=0 or {Ai}
i=n−1
i=0 the ring for
σ indiscriminatingly. And we will call a party not
being Ak a non-signer. If a party is in {Ai}i=n−1i=0 ,
he will be called a ring member. And a party not
in {Ai}i=n−1i=0 will be called a non-ring-member.
- RVerify: It takes the message m, the ring L, and
the controllable ring signature σ, and outputs either
1 or 0 meaning whether σ is valid for m and L or
not.
- AIdentify: It is a protocol between the signer Ak
and a verifier. The common inputs are the message
m, the ring {pki}i=n−1i=0 and the controllable ring
signature σ for m and L generated by Ak. It allows
Ak to anonymously prove his authorship of σ. We
require that the verifier cannot get any information
about identity of the real signer from the properties
of the communication channel.
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- SSign: It takes m′, π, σ, and outputs an anonymous
signature σ′ on the message m′. Here, π is the
secret information associated with the controllable
ring signature σ. We call σ′ a linkable signature for
σ.
- SVerify: It takes a message m′, a controllable
signature signature σ and a linkable signature σ′,
and outputs 1 or 0 meaning whether σ′ and σ are
linkable (i.e., whether σ and σ′ are generated by
the same anonymous ring member).
- Convert/CVerify: After the real signer of a control-
lable signature σ reveals the relative secret infor-
mation π and his identity Ak, every one can verify
whether σ is generated by Ak.
B. Security Requirements of Controllable Ring Signatures
We now describe four security requirements of a
controllable ring signature scheme, which are perfec-
t anonymity, uncontrollability, I-unforgeability, and II-
unforgeability. In the following definitions, adversaries
will be allowed to query some oracles: (1) A controllable
ring signing oracle OR which returns a controllable ring
signature with respect to the queried message m, the
ring L; (2) a converted ring signing oracle OCR which
returns a converted ring signature with respect to the
queried message m, the ring L and the real signer Ak; (3)
an anonymously identifying oracle OA which returns an
interactive proof for knowing the secret value associated
with the queried controllable ring signature; (4) a linkable
signing oracle OS which returns a linkable signature
on the queried message for the given controllable ring
signature; (5) the corrupting oracle OK which returns the
secret key corresponding to the queried public key pk.
Definition 2 (Signer Anonymity): Let L = {pk0, pk1,
. . .,pkn−1} where each key is generated as (pki, ski) ←
GenKey(1κi). A controllable ring signature scheme is
perfectly signer-anonymous if, for any L, any message m,
and any σ generated by RSign(m,L, sk) where sk is uni-
formly chosen from {sk0, sk1, . . . , skn}, given (L,m, σ),
any unbound adversary AOA,OS (L,m, σ) outputs i such
that sk = ski with probability exactly 1/|L|.
The above property ensures that the real signer remains
unconditionally anonymous even after he generates link-
able signatures or anonymously proves his authorship,
as long as he does not convert this controllable ring
signature.
Definition 3 (Uncontrollability against Non-Signers):
Let L be the ring {pk0, pk1, . . . , pkn−1} where
(pki, ski) ← GenKey(1κi). Let κ = min(κ0, . . . , κn−1).
A controllable ring signature scheme is uncontrollable
if, for any L, any message m, and any σ generated
by RSign(m,L, sk) where sk R←− {sk0, sk1, . . . , skn},
any polynomial-time oracle machine AOA,OS succeeds
only with negligible probability in κ for any one of the
following tasks: for the ring signature (L,m, σ) which
is not converted, he tries to generate a valid linkable
signature for (L,m, σ), or prove the authorship, or
output(π′, pk′) such that CVerify(L,m, σ, π′, pk′) = 1;
for the converted ring signature (L,m, σ, pk, π), he
tries to output another pair (π′′, pk′′) for pk′′ 6= pk s.t.
CVerify(L,m, σ, π′′, pk′′) = 1.
The above property ensures that a controllable ring sig-
nature cannot be controlled by any non-signer: before the
controllable ring signature is converted, any non-signer
cannot anonymously claim the authorship, generate a link-
able signature or convert it. Furthermore, it ensures that
any non-signer cannot dishonestly convert a controllable
ring signature even he attains the correct converted ring
signature.
Definition 4: (I-Unforgeability against Non-Ring-
Members) Let (pki, ski) is generated by running
GenKey(1κi) for i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Let κ=min{
κ0,. . . , κn−1} andL = {pk0, . . . , pkn−1}. A control-
lable ring signature scheme is existentiallyI-unforgeable
against adaptive chosen-message and chosen public key
attacks if, for any polynomial-time oracle machine AOR
such that (L,m, σ) ← AOR(L), its output satisfies
RVerify(L,m, σ) = 1 only with negligible probability in
κ. Restriction is that L ⊆ L and (L,m, σ) does not appear
in the set of oracle queries and replies between A and OR.
Roughly speaking, as in a standard ring signature scheme,
any controllable ring signature cannot be forged by any
non-ring member. Note that the above definition is almost
the same to the unforgeability defined in [6] with trivial
and negligible differences.
Definition 5: (II-Unforgeability of Converted Ring
Signatures) Let L = {pk0, pk1, . . ., pkn−1} where
each key is generated as (pki, ski) ← GenKey(1κi).
A controllable ring signature scheme is II-unforgeable
against non-signers if, any polynomial time adver-
sary AOCR,OK (L) outputs (m,L, σ, π, pk) such that
CVerify(L,m, σ, pk, π) = 1 with only negligible proba-
bility in κ. Restriction is that A does not get the secret key
sk corresponding to pk from the oracle OK and A does
not get the converted ring signature (σ, π) with respect to
(L,m, pk) from the oracle OCR.
The above property ensures that: for a ring L, even if
the attacker corrupts all ring members but the single one
Ak which he will attack, he can not forge the converted
ring signature due to the party Ak. Trivially, this property
implies that the real signer is not able to dishonestly
convert a ring signature into that due to the other ring
member.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS AND THE PARADIGM
In this section, we briefly describe some cryptographic
schemes that will be used to construct our controllable
ring signature.
A. Abe et al.’s Ring Signature Scheme
Genkey’: Let pi, qi be large primes. Let 〈gi〉 denote a
prime subgroup of Zpi generated by gi whose order is
qi. Choose a random xi ∈ Zqi as the secret key and set
yi = g
xi
i mod pi. Let Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Zqi be publicly
available hash functions. Let pki = (pi, qi, gi, yi, Hi) be
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the DL public key of the ring member Ai. Let L be the
set {pki}n−1i=0 .
RSign’: Ak generates a ring signature for the message m
and the ring L as follows.
1) Initialization Select α ∈R Zqk and compute ek =
gαk mod pk. Compute ck+1 = Hk+1(L, m, ek).
2) Forward Sequence: For i = k + 1, . . . , n −
1, 0, . . . , k − 1, select si
R←− Zqi and compute





3) Forming the ring: Compute sk = α − ckxk
mod qk.
The resulting signature is
σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pk0, . . . , pkn−1).
RVerify’: A ring signature σ= (c0, s0,. . ., sn−1;
pk0,. . .,pkn−1) for the message m is verified as follows.
For i = 0, . . . , n − 1, compute ei = gsii y
ci
i mod pi and
then compute ci+1 = Hi+1(L,m, ei) if i 6= n−1. Accept
if c0 = H0(L,m, en−1). Reject otherwise.
B. Pedersen’s Commitment Scheme
Pedersen’s commitment scheme [14] is as follows. Let
the DL public key (p, q, g, y) be generated as in the the
above scheme and the secret key logg y be generated by
a trusted center. The committer commits himself to an
c ∈ Zq by choosing s ∈R Zq at random and computing
E(c, s) = gcys mod p. For E(c, s) = gcys mod p,
logg y is the trapdoor: given c, s and logg y, it is easy





For this commitment scheme, we have the following
properties (1) statistical hiding: E(c, s) reveals no infor-
mation about c; (2) computational binding: the committer
cannot open a commitment to c as c′ 6= c unless he
can find logg y; (3) trapdoor exposure: (c, s) and (c
′, s′)
satisfying E(c, s) = E(c′, s′) and (c, s) 6= (c′, s′) can be
used to compute the trapdoor logg y.
There is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol for
proof of knowledge of the opening (c, s) for a commit-
ment E(c, s) [15]. Based on this basic protocol, it is easy
to modularly construct a digital signature using the Fiat-
Shamir technique [16] or to a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of (c, s) secure against cheating verifiers using
the paradigm proposed in [17].
C. A New Variant Schnorr Signature Scheme
In this section, we will construct a special digital
signature scheme by sequentially applying two modular
transformations [16], [18] to the well-known Schnorr
identification protocol [19]. It is obvious that the resulting
signature scheme is inferior to the Schnorr signature
scheme, but we claim that the purpose to propose the
following scheme is not for a practical digital signature
scheme but for showing the security of our proposed
controllable ring signature.
Now, we present the new variant Schnorr signature
scheme as follows.
1) Key Generation: The signer’s public key is a
DL public key pk1 = (p1, q1, g1, y1, H1) as in
the above ring signature scheme. And the signing
secret key is x1 = logg1 y1. Additionally, the DL
public key pkt = (pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht) for the trapdoor
commitment is also needed. Here, it is required that
the secret key is not known by any one. In practice,
such pkt can be generated as follows.
Let pt and qt be two large primes such that qt|pt−1
and q2t - pt−1 and gt be the generater of the q-order
subgroup. Ht : {0, 1}∗ → Zqt is the cryptographic
hash function. Additionally, we also need another
public hash function H ′t : {0, 1}∗ → Zpt . Set yt =
H ′t(l)
(pt−1)/qt mod pt where l can be any publicly
known string, e,g., l = pt||qt||gt.
Note that if qt|pt − 1 and q2t - pt − 1, then
r
pt−1
qt mod pt is always an element generated by
gt for any r ∈ Z∗pt . Also note that it is easy
to check whether pt, qt, gt, yt (with public l) are
honestly generated. And given honestly generated
pt, qt, gt, yt, it is infeasible for one to get loggt yt.
For simplicity, we just assume that pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht
are public parameters where loggt yt is not known
by anyone.
2) Signing: Given the message m, first select α ∈R Zq
and compute e = gα1 mod p1. Then compute the
Pedersen’s commitment of e as e′ = gHt(e)t y
r
t
mod p2 where r ∈R Zqt . Next, compute c =
H1(m, e
′) and s = α − cx1 mod q1. The output
signature σ = (c, s, r).
3) Verification: Given the signature σ = (c, s, r) and
the message m, check whether









We give the security analysis as follows. First, we re-
view the two underlying paradigms for the above scheme.
In [18], the Damgård’s paradigm was proposed to modu-
larly turn a special honest-verifier zero-knowledge proto-
col (called Σ-protocol) into a concurrent zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge in the auxiliary string model (i.e., it is
assumed that the secret key for the trapdoor commitment
is not known by any one except the trusted party). The
Fiat-Shamir paradigm [16] is widely used to modularly
construct a digital signature scheme secure in the ran-
dom oracle model from a three-pass secure identification
against passive attacks [20]. It is easy to see that the
above scheme is constructed by sequentially applying the
Damgård’s transformation and the Fiat-Shamir paradigm
to the Schnorr identification protocol. The unforgeability
of the digital signature can be modularly derived from
the properties of the two paradigms [18], [20]. Here, we
omit the straightforward and lengthy security proof from
scratch. In more details, we have the following lemma
which will be used to show the security of the controllable
ring signature scheme:
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Claim 1: If the hash function H1 is assumed to be
a random oracle, the other hash function H2 is collision-
resistant, the secret key loggt yt for the commitment is not
be known by anyone and the discrete logarithm problem
is intractable, then the above digital signature scheme
is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-
message attacks.
IV. PROPOSED CONTROLLABLE RING SIGNATURE
SCHEME
A. Paradigm for Constructing Controllable Ring Signa-
tures
Note that for an ordinary ring signature, although every
ring member can anonymously generate a signature, he
has to “close the ring” at his own position using his
own secret key. If the real signer hides some proof for
the “closing position” in the ring signature (in our con-
struction, we perfectly hide the proof through Pedersen’s
commitment scheme.), he will be able to control it as fol-
lows. On the one hand, before the hidden proof is public,
this controllable ring signature is just like a standard ring
signature. And the real signer can anonymously prove his
authorship, or generate linkable ring signatures by using
the hidden proof as the secret key. After the hidden proof
is public, this controllable ring signature is converted into
a standard signature generated by the real signer.
B. The Proposed Scheme
Our scheme is the extension of the above reviewed ring
signature scheme from [6] as follows.
Genkey: A user’s key (pk, sk) of the DL-type is gen-
erated as in Genkey′. Additionally, the DL public key
pkt = (pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht) for the trapdoor commitment is
also needed. Here, it is required that the secret key is not
known by any one. It can be generated as described in the
new variant Schnorr digital signature scheme in Section
3.3.
RSign/RVerify: A signer Ak generates a controllable
ring signature for the message m and the ring L, in the
following way.
1) Initialization (1) Select α ∈R Zqk and compute
ek = g
α
k mod pk. (2) Compute ct = Ht(ek),





mod pt. (3) Compute ck+1 = Hk+1(L, m, ek, et).
2) Forward Sequence: For i = k + 1, . . . , n −
1, 0, . . . , k − 1, select si
R←− Zqi and compute ei =
gsii y
ci
i mod pi and set ci+1 = Hi+1(L,m, ei, et).
3) Forming the ring: Compute sk = α − ckxk
mod qk.
The resulting ring signature is
σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1)
and the real signer will store the secret information
(ct, st).
A controllable ring signature
σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1)
for the message m is verified as follows. For i =
0, . . . , n − 1, compute ei = gsii y
ci
i mod pi and then
compute ci+1 = Hi+1(L,m, ei, et) if i 6= n − 1. Accept
if c0 = H0(L,m, en−1, et). Reject otherwise.
Note that we refer the reader to the 3 facts in the
next section for the basic idea underlying the above
construction and the next protocols or algorithms.
AIdentify: For a valid controllable ring signature σ =
(c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . ., pkn−1) of the message
m, the real signer anonymously proves his authorship of σ
through a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of (ct, st)
s.t. et = gctt y
st
t mod pt as follows:
1) The verifier randomly chooses c′, s′, t′1, t
′
2 and com-










Then (e′, x′) is sent to the prover.
2) The real signer picks random numbers t1, t2 ∈ Z∗qt ,
and computes x = gt1t y
t2
t mod pt. Then the re-
al signer randomly selects r′′1 , r
′′
2 , z
′′ ∈ Zqt and






′z′′ mod pt. Next the real
signer randomly selects z′ ∈ Zqt . At last, (x, x′′, z′)
is sent to the verifier.
3) The verifier computes r′1 = t
′
1− z′c′ mod qt, r′2 =
t′2−z′s′ mod qt, choose a random number z̃ ∈ Zqt
and sends (r′1, r
′
2, z̃) to the real signer.







mod pt. If so, the real signer sends to the verifier
z′′, r′′1 , r
′′
2 and (z, r1, r2) such that:
z = z′′ ⊕ z̃, r1 = t1 − zct, r2 = t2 − zst.
5) The verifier will accept that the prover is the real











′z′′ mod pt and z̃ = z′′ ⊕ z. Otherwise,
he will reject it.
Here note that, as in Def.3, we implicitly assume that the
verifier has obtained the authentic ring signature before he
requires the anonymous proof. In fact, this can be easily
implemented. For example, he can sign the ring signature
using his secret key, sends it to the real signer and requires
anonymous proof for the authorship of this signed ring
signature.
SSign/SVerify: For a valid controllable ring signature
σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1) on the
message m, the linkable signature (z, r1, r2) on a message
m′ is generated as follows:
t1, t2




t mod pt, z = Ht(m
′, x),
r1 = t1 − zct mod qt, r2 = t2 − zst mod qt.
The verifier will accept that (z, r1, r2) and σ is signed





mod pt) = z and reject otherwise.
Convert/CVerify: To convert a controllable ring signature
σ, the real signer Ak releases the relative st such that et =
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t mod pt. (σ, st) will be called the
converted ring signature due to the party Ak.
To check whether (σ, r) is a valid converted ring
signature due to the party Ak, the verifier checks whether











where ck is computed as in RVerify.
Remark 1: In the above scheme, given a controllable
ring signature, there is no way for the receiver to check
whether this ring signature can be correctly converted.
In other words, for a controllable ring signature, the
verifier can only check whether it is generated by a ring
member but can not check whether it is controllable.
However, in some applications, it may be necessary for
the verifier to be convinced of the convertibility. In fact,
the above scheme can be easily extended to support a
non-interactive proof for the convertibility of the con-
trollable ring signature. We will show that the proof
for controllability can be implemented using 1-out-of-n
witness indistinguishable proofs with a concrete discrete
logarithm setting [21].
Concretely speaking, to convince the receiver of the
controllability, the real signer should present an non-






ct ∈ {Ht(e0), Ht(e1), . . . ,Ht(en−1)}
where ei = gsii y
ci
i mod pi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1. The







ct ∈ {Ht(e0), Ht(e1), . . . ,Ht(en−1)}.
In other words, the real signer should prove
knowledge of one of the n logarithms
logyt(etg
−Ht(e0)
t ), . . . , logyt(etg
−Ht(en−1)
t ). According
to [21], this kind of non-interactive proof of 1-out-of-n
knowledge in a concrete discrete logarithm setting can
be easily constructed.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before analyzing the security of the above controllable
ring signature, we first point the following simple facts
about the basic tools in our scheme without detailed
explanation:
Fact 1. RSign/RVerify is same to the ring signature (all
discrete case) proposed in [6] except that et is inserted
in our controllable ring signature.
Fact 2. AIdentify is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of (ct, st) satisfying et = gctt y
st
t mod pt.
Sketch of proof: This protocol is modularly constructed
by applying the paradigm proposed in [17] to the honest-
verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the open-
ing of the Pedersen’s commitment [15]. In more details,
the verifier first present the commitment e′ of the value t1
and then proves the knowledge of the opening. Next, the
prover proves that he knows the opening of e′ or et. The
fact that Adentify is zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
of (ct, st) can be modularly derived from the paradigm
[17]. Here we omit the proof from scratch.
Fact 3. SSign /SVerify is transformed from the iden-





t and (ct, st) is the secret key)due to Okamoto
[15] via the Fiat-Shamir technique [16].
Based on the above facts, we can easily analyze the
security of our proposed controllable ring signature in-
formally.
Theorem 1: The above scheme is unconditionally
anonymous.
Proof (1). From the probabilistic process of RSign,
we can see that: (a) all si, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, are
randomly distributed in Zqi ; (b) et is randomly dis-
tributed in Zpt since st ∈R Zqt and ek is randomly
distributed in Zpk ; (c) c0 is also fixed when L =
{pki}ni=1,m, et, ek, s0, . . . , sn−1 are fixed. So for fixed
L,m, the distribution of (et, c0, s1, . . . , sn−1) is indepen-
dent of the public key of the real signer.
(2). First, the protocol AIdentify is zero-knowledge
secure against cheating verifiers. Especially, the proof is
witness-indistinguishable since the proof is independent
of which of {(ct, st)|et = gctt y
st
t mod pt} used by
the prover. Second, the linkable signature (z, r1, r2) is
determined by the random chosen (t1, t2) and indepen-
dent of which of {(ct, st)|et = gctt y
st
t mod pt} used by
the signer. So there is no information of (ct, st) leaked
through the protocol AIdentify and the linkable signatures.
Combining (1) and (2), we can see that for a
controllable ring signature, the ring signature itself,
the anonymous proof of authorship and the linkable
signatures are all independent of which of (ct, st) in
{(ct, st)|et = gctt y
st
t mod pt}. So we can conclude that
the identity of the real signer is unconditionally protected
as long as the real signer does not exposes his identity
to the verifier.
Theorem 2: The above scheme is uncontrollable.
Proof Let σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1)




From the Fact 2,3, it is obvious that the attacker
can control a controllable ring signature through any of





t mod pt. However, before the real signer
publishes (st, ct), ct is unconditionally hidden in et.
And the attacker cannot get (ct, st) by accessing the
oracle corresponding to AIdnetify since AIdentify is zero-
knowledge. Neither can the attacker get (ct, st) by query-
ing the OS oracle because of Fact 3. So before (ct, st)
is public, no non-signer can control the controllable ring
signature.
According to CVerify, if (σ, st) and (σ, s′t) are valid
converted ring signatures due to Ak and Ak′ respectively,






t mod pt, where
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By two different opening of the same et, the trapdoor
loggt yt can be easily derived. However, in our scheme,
it is infeasible for one to compute loggt yt. So after a
controllable ring signature σ is converted, any non-signer
cannot prove that σ was not generated by Ak.
Theorem 3: In the random oracle model, our control-
lable ring signature scheme is I-unforgeable against non-
ring-members if Abe et al.’s ring signature is existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message and public
key attacks.
Proof After comparing the definitions of the I-
unforgeability and the unforgeability in [6], and the two
ring signing algorithms of RSign in Section 3.1 and
RSign′ in Section 4, it is straightforward to derive the
conclusion.
Theorem 4: Our controllable ring signature scheme is
II-unforgeable if the signature scheme in Section 3.3
is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-
message attacks.
Proof For the formal definition of existential unforgeabil-
ity against adaptively chosen-message attacks, we refer
the readers to [22]. Let F1 be the II-forger attacking
our controllable ring signature scheme. We will use it to
construct a (adaptively chosen-message attacker) forger
F2 attacking the signature scheme in Section 3.3. The
challenger for F2 provides the signing public key pk,
the committing public key pkt = (pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht) and
the signing oracle which returns a valid signature on the
queried message.
First, F2 simulates the ring L in which one is the
the public key pk and the others are generated by him-
self using Genkey. Here note that for the public keys
generated by himself, F2 knows the secret keys. F2
initialize F1 by sending the ring L and the public key
pkt = (pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht). Second, when F1 queries the
signing oracle OCR on the message m, the ring L =
{pk0, pk1, . . . , pk|L|−1} ⊂ L, and the public key pkk ∈
L, F2 will simulates the converted ring signature due to
pkk as follows. If pkk 6= pk, with the secret key skk
relative to pkk, F2 uses RSign and Convert to generate a
converted ring signature and returns it. If pkk = pk, F2
queries its challenger on the message m′ = (L,m, gαk−1k−1 )
where αk−1 ∈R Zqk−1 . After receiving the signature
(ck, sk, r), F2 computes ek = gskk y
ck





t mod pt, and sets ck+1 = Hk+1(L,m, ek, et).
Then, for i = k+ 1, . . . , |L| − 1, 0, . . . , k− 2, F2 selects





For i = k − 1, compute sk−1 = αk−1 − ck−1xk−1
mod qk−1. Now F2 returns the converted signature (σ, r)
where σ = (c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1). It
is obvious that the converted ring signatured (σ, r) is valid
only if (ck, sk, r) is a valid signature.
Third, when F1 queries the corrupting oracle OK on
the public key in L, F2 returns the secret key if this public
key is generated by F2. Otherwise, F2 aborts.
At last, F1 returns a converted ring signature (σ, r)
due to pkk on the message m, the ring L ⊂ L. Let σ be
(c0, s0, . . . , sn−1; pkt, et; pk0, . . . , pkn−1). If pkk = pk,
then F2 returns (ck, sk, r) as the signature on the message
m′ = (L,m, ek−1). If pkk 6= pk, F2 aborts. Here, it is









mod pt) if (σ, r) is valid converted ring signature due to
pkk.
Now, we analyze the probability that F2 does not
aborts. Note that in the above simulation, all the public
keys in the L play the same roles and pk cannot be
distinguished from the other public keys. Since at
least one public key in the L is not corrupted, so the
probability that the public key pk is not queried on the
oracle OK is at least 1|L| . The probability that F1 returns
the converted ring signature corresponding to pk is at
least 1|L| . So The probability that F2 does not aborts is
at least 1|L|2 . Since a valid converted ring signature (σ, r)









mod pt), ck, sk, r is just a digital signature with respect
to the signature scheme in Section 3.3 with the public
key pkk and the message m′ = (L,m, ek−1). So if F1
can succeed in forging a valid converted ring signature
with probability larger than ε1, then F2 succeeds
in attacking the digital signature scheme in Section
3.3 with probability ε2 ≥ 1|L|2 ε1. By Lemma 1, the
II-unforgeability of our controllable ring signature is
obtained.
VI. E-PROSECUTION SCHEME BASED ON
CONTROLLABLE SIGNATURES
In this section, based on the above controllable sig-
nature scheme, we design the E-prosecution scheme as
follows. This E-prosecution scheme involves two parties:
the public authority such as the police office, and the
group (ring) of all possible prosecutors. By this scheme,
the prosecutor can prosecute sequential messages First
and i-th offline prosection, and even anonymously ini-
tiates an online discussion with the authority (Online
Anonymous Prosection), and collect the reward by
opening this identity to authority (Award Collection). As
will be shown in the security analysis, this E-Prosecution
can well protect the identity privacy of the prosecutor.
• System Setup: In this phase, the public authority
At and the possible prosecutors Ai (0 ≤ in − 1)
generates their public/privat key pairs respectively.
Just like Genkey, for each possible prosecutor Ai
indexed by i, let pi, qi be large primes. Let 〈gi〉
denote a prime subgroup of Zpi generated by gi
whose order is qi. Choose a random xi ∈ Zqi
as the secret key and set yi = gxii mod pi. Let
Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Zqi be publicly available hash
functions. Let pki = (pi, qi, gi, yi, Hi) be the DL
public key of the ring member Ai. Let L be the
set {pki}n−1i=0 . Similarly, the public authority At
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generates his public key pki = (pt, qt, gt, yt, Ht) and
the private key xt such that yt = gxtt .
• First Offline Anonymous Prosecution: In this
phase, the real prosecutor Ak decides the first pros-
ecution message m1, generates the ring signature
σ1 = (c10, s
1








0, . . . , pk
1
n−1), by
running the algorithm RSign. Then the real prose-
cutor sends (σ1,m1) to the authority. The authority
can check whether this prosecution comes from one
of the ring by running the algorithm RSign.
• i-th Offline Anonymous Prosecution (i > 1):
Here, our prosecution scheme can provide the re-
al prosecutor the ability to continue prosecuting
some messages. In this way, the receiver can check
whether these sequential prosecuted messages come
from the original prosecutor, although the real pros-
ecutor remains anonymous. In this phase, to pros-
ecute the i-th message mi, the real prosecutor Ak
generate the signature σi = (zi, ri1, r
i
2) by running
the algorithm SSign. Then he sends (σ1,m1, σi,mi)
to the authority. By running RVerify,SVerify, the
authority can check whether these two signature
were generated by the same prosecutor which is
anonymous in the ring.
• Online Anonymous Prosecution. In some cases,
the online anonymous discussion between the real
prosecutor Ak and the authority At may be needed.
For example, required by the prosecutor or the au-
thority, the real prosecutor may call the the authority
for discussing some details on his prosecution. To
this end, the prosecutor can anonymously authen-
ticate himself by running the protocol AIdentify.
Once the anonymous authentication is accepted, the
authority can assure the real prosecutor anonymously
and can discuss some details on the prosecution with
the prosecutor.
• Award Collection. At last, after running Convert,
the real prosecutor Ak can prove that he is the









t mod pt. By running CVerfi-
ty, the authority can check this fact. If the authority
accepts, the real prosecutor will get his reward.
Next, we analyze the security of the above E-
Prosecution scheme.
• The prosecutor remains anonymous even after he
opens this identity to the authority.
Before opening the commitment et = gctt y
st
t , the
identity relative information ct = Ht(ek) is uncon-
ditionally secure in the information theory sense.
This is because for every possible value of ct =
Ht(ek′)(k
′ 6= k) corresponding to any possible
prosecutor in the ring, there exists a value st such
that et = gctt y
st
t .
After opening (ct, st) to authority, the authority can
generate one value st for any value ct = Ht(ek′)
(k′ 6= k). Since he can arbitrarily open et for
any possible prosecutor in the ring, any third party
will not believe the authority’s opening. Hence, the
prosecutor always remains secure.
• After the first offline prosecution and before award
collection, only the real prosecutor knows the open-
ing (ct, st) for the commitment et = gctt y
st
t , accord-
ing to the discrete logarithm assumption. Here note
that before the real prosecutor discloses his identity
to the authority, even the authority himself can not
open the commitment. In fact, directly opening et
still means solving the discrete logarithm for the
authority. Of course, after the prosecutor open the
commitment to the authority, he can arbitrarily open
the commitment using his secret key as the trapdoor.
Hence, only the real prosector can make sequential
offline prosection, anonymous online prosection and
award collection.
• If the prosecutor wants to further make the prosecut-
ed message secret, he can (1) generate all the relative
signatures on the commitment m′ = gmt y
r
t instead of
the message m, (2) encrypt the message m into the
ciphertext c using a certain public key encryption
scheme with the yt as the public key, (3) and sends
the relative signature σ, the partial opening value r
and the ciphertext c to the prosecutor. In this way,
firstly, any third party can not obtain the message m
from the communication procession. Secondly, the
authority can not prove to one third party that there
is one prosecutor who prosecuted the message m.
This because the authority can use his private key
as the commitment trapdoor to arbitrarily open the
commitment m′ = gmt y
r
t for any possible message
m.
• The real prosecutor cannot frame any other party in
the ring. The reason is that after the prosecution, if
the real prosecutor wants to maliciously claim that
it is not himself but a certain other party Ak′ who
made the prosecution, he will face the problem of









k′ mod pk′). Without the trapdoor
xt such that yt = gxtt , this operation is infeasible for
the real prosecutor.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we revisited the classic application of a
ring signature in leaking secrets and point out a list of
problems unsolved by a standard ring signature. Motivat-
ed these problems, we formalized a new cryptographic
concept called a controllable ring signature and propose
a concrete scheme. This extension of a standard ring
signature can fully ensure the interests of the real signer:
(1) the real signer remains unconditional anonymous as
long as he does not remove anonymity; (2) only the
real signer can control the ring signature: only he can
anonymously prove the authorship, generate a linkable
ring signature or convert it. On the other hand, a ring
member is rightly restricted since he can not generate
a controllable ring signature and convince one that it
is generated by others. At last, using this controllable
840 JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 8, NO. 4, APRIL 2013
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ring signature scheme, we design a secure E-prosecution
scheme.
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